The Supreme Court Expands Civil Remedies for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence

On May 15, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, recognizing for the first time the tort of intimate partner violence in Canadian common law.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kasirer held that existing torts such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not adequately capture the full nature and harm of coercive and controlling abuse within intimate relationships.

Facts

Ms. Ahluwalia and Mr. Ahluwalia were married for approximately sixteen years. Throughout the marriage, Mr. Ahluwalia subjected Ms. Ahluwalia to physical, psychological and emotional abuse. His conduct involved ongoing patterns of coercion and control, including physical assaults, financial coercion, isolation from family members, and prolonged silent treatment.

After Mr. Ahluwalia initiated divorce proceedings, Ms. Ahluwalia sought various family law remedies, including sole decision-making responsibility for the children, child and spousal support, equalization of property, and sale of the matrimonial home. Acting as a self-represented litigant, she also claimed damages for the abuse she had suffered during the marriage.

At trial, the judge recognized a new tort of family violence and awarded Ms. Ahluwalia compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages, finding existing torts inadequate to address the cumulative and relational harm of coercive abuse. On appeal, Mr. Ahluwalia conceded liability under existing torts, and the Court of Appeal held the abuse was actionable but rejected the need for a new tort, concluding existing doctrines were sufficient. Ms. Ahluwalia then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Recognition of the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

The Supreme Court recognized a new tort of intimate partner violence. The majority emphasized that intimate partner violence is not simply a series of isolated incidents, but rather a pattern of coercion, domination, and control that erodes a person’s autonomy and equality over time.

Justice Kasirer explained that existing torts are largely episodic in nature and fail to capture the broader relational harm caused by coercive control. Requiring survivors to divide their experiences into discrete claims for assault, battery, or emotional distress risks mischaracterizing the true nature of the wrong and may result in inadequate compensation.

The majority held that intimate partner violence interferes with fundamental legal interests in dignity, autonomy, and equality. The Court therefore concluded that incremental development of the common law was warranted.

In recognizing the new tort, however, the Court rejected the broader formulation adopted by the trial judge. The majority held that a tort of “family violence” was overly broad because it encompassed a wide range of family relationships without sufficient doctrinal precision. Instead, the Court confined the new tort to the specific dynamics of intimate partner relationships.

The New Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

The Court established a three-part test for the tort of intimate partner violence. A plaintiff must prove that:

1. the wrongful conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath;
2. the defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct; and
3. the conduct, assessed objectively, amounted to coercive control.

The majority held that coercive control may include both physical and non-physical abuse, including isolation, humiliation, surveillance, intimidation, financial control, sexual coercion, and psychological manipulation where such conduct forms part of a sustained pattern of domination.

Applying this framework, the Court concluded that Ms. Ahluwalia had established all elements of the tort. Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct systematically undermined her dignity, autonomy, and equality within the relationship, entitling her to damages under the newly recognized tort.

The Court was also careful to say that violence between intimate partners must be distinguished from mere grievances and hurtful and vengeful behaviour. An intimate partnership that is dysfunctional or even intolerable, or includes dishonesty, infidelity, emotional neglect, and disagreements do not necessarily reflect controlling or coercive conduct and will not necessarily give rise to a claim for damages under the new tort.

A Claim for Intimate Partner Violence Can Be Included in a Family Law Claim or Through a Separate Civil Action

The decision confirms that claims for intimate partner violence may now be pleaded alongside family law remedies within matrimonial proceedings or pursued independently through a separate civil action. The recognition of the tort therefore expands the legal tools available for survivors seeking compensation for abusive conduct occurring as a result of an intimate relationships.

Limitation Periods May Not Apply

Civil claims must be made before the limitation period expires. In Ontario, this generally means within two years, with some exceptions that should be discussed with a lawyer. Existing provincial legislation generally exempts claims for assault and battery arising in intimate relationships from limitation periods, but no equivalent exemption applies to intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The majority characterized coercive intimate partner violence as a continuing injury, which may defeat limitation arguments in many cases, meaning the two year limitation period might not apply. However, the Court acknowledged that extending statutory limitation exemptions expressly to the new tort may ultimately require legislative action.

The New Tort is Expected to Improve Access to Justice

The majority decision notes important ways that the new tort will improve access to justice and address existing barriers that often prevent survivors of intimate partner violence from bringing claims. One of the key ways it will practically improve access to justice is that the tort is not confined to conduct that inflicts psychological injury. This is an important distinction between the existing tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). To successfully make a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must prove symptoms of emotional distress. The Court notes that IIED is ill-suited for coercion that does not produce visible and provable psychological illness.

But in practice, the barriers to accessing justice are more pervasive. A claim of IIED puts a plaintiff’s mental ell-being at issue. This can re-victimize the plaintiff by requiring disclosure of deeply personal mental health records to the very abuser who caused psychological injury. Costly expert evidence is also often required to prove the injury exists and that it was caused by the abuser. Both disclosure and the cost of expert evidence are significant barriers to seeking compensation and justice.

The new tort does not require proof of any harm. Once the three elements of an intimate partnership with intentional conduct that amounts to coercive control are established, harm is presumed present, and liability is established.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

Justice Karakatsanis concurred in the result but expressed concern that the tort should not be restricted solely to cases involving “coercive control,” and should instead include all forms of intimate partner violence.

Justices Jamal, Côté, and Rowe would have dismissed the appeal. The dissenting judges concluded that the existing tort framework was sufficient to address both discrete incidents and broader patterns of abuse. They also expressed concern that recognizing a new tort could create doctrinal uncertainty.